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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICS OF TRADE:
THE BANANA WAR WITH EUROPE AND THE CARIBBEAN

by
Niala Boodhoo
Florida International University,
Miami,

2000

Florida

Professor Eduardo Gamarra,

Major Professor

This thesis examines the involvement of the United
States in the decade-long trade dispute before the World
Trade Organization

(WTO) over the European Union's

preferential banana regime.

Washington's justification for

bringing this case to the WTO comes from Section 301 of the

U.S. trade act, which allows for disputes to be undertaken
if U.S.
first

"interests" are violated;

however,

this is the

case ever undertaken by the United States that does

not directly threaten any American banana industry,
affect any American jobs.

Why,

then,

nor

would the United

States involve itself in this European-Caribbean-Latin
American dispute?
It is the contention of this thesis that the United
States thrust itself headlong into this debate for two

Vr

reasons:

domestically,

the United States

Representative came under pressure,
Congress,

Trade

via the White House and

from Chiquita CEO Carl Lindner,

who in the past

decade donated more than $7.1 million to American
politicians to take the case to the WTO.

Internationally,

the United States used the case as an opportunity to assert
its power over Europe,

with the Eastern Caribbean islands

being caught in the economic crossfire.
existing literature,

in undertaking this case,

States did as any nation would:

the United

it operated within both

domestic and international levels,
key interests,

According to

satisfying at each level

with the overall goal of maintaining the

nation's best interests.
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Chapter One
THE BANANA WAR

Several years ago,
prophetic

"Banana Death"

Trinidad's David Rudder composed a
calypso:

The West Indian girl start
to cry,
Banana dead, banana dead, banana
The future dread, the future dread for

banana.'

What Rudder had put to verse was the decade-long "Banana
war"

that entangled the Eastern Caribbean in the crossfire

between the United States and Europe.

While its beginnings

go back to the colonial relationship between Europe, namely
Great Britain,

and the Caribbean,

the current dispute of

the past decade is a result of relations between the United
States and Europe.

On the surface,

this trade dispute was

about Europe's preferential trading agreements with the
Eastern Caribbean that discriminated against Latin American
bananas,

and subsequently also the American transnational

companies that control the Latin American industry.
detailed examination of the issue,
deeper issues.

however,

In the domestic sense,

A

reveals several

it demonstrates the

power of private versus public interests in the shaping of
some government policy.

In regards to foreign policy,

it

is a contemporary example of how the United States reacts
to its neighbors, both to the south in the Eastern

1

Caribbean and to the west in Europe,

in the context of a

trade dispute that it initiated. Finally,

significantly,

and perhaps most

the case serves as an indication of the

state of international relations between the United States,
Europe and the Caribbean in a post-Cold War era of

globalization.
The trade rules in question are the European banana
regime,

a complex system of preferences geared toward

helping the Eastern Caribbean islands and other former
European colonies through Europe's preferential banana
trade agreement.
the African,

The essential core of the agreements gave

Caribbean and Pacific nations duty-free access

to certain European Union

(EU)

countries and imposed a

quota limit on Latin American banana imports.

The regime

also called for an import licensing arrangement that gave
preference to European,

namely British,

the bananas into the United Kingdom

marketers to bring

(UK).

The United

States based its case against the regime by arguing,
successfully, that the preferences discriminated against
American multinational corporations whose bananas came from
Latin America,

the so-called dollar banana industry.

Latin American countries,

Ecuador,

Guatemala,

Honduras and

Mexico eventually joined the United States in the WTO

2

(Four

dispute.)

By the time the United States made its final,

most forceful and eventually successful push against the
regime in the spring of 1999,

first GATT and then the WTO

had already ruled twice that the European Union's regime
discriminated against the larger,

corporate Latin American

banana industry.
In 1998,

despite the fact that its dispute about

bananas was still pending resolution through the World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Board,
anticipation of
challenge.

in

its victory the United States escalated its

Washington released a list of

"retaliatory" 100

percent tariffs on several dozen European imports,

the

initial list including cheese, ballpoint pens, furs,
lithographs,

among others. The United States threatened

that the tariffs--recompense for the losses suffered by
American transnational banana companies prohibited from
fully entering the European banana market--would take
effect on March 3,

1999,

if the European market did not

immediately relax its preferential schemes which
discriminated against Latin American bananas.
The United States succeeded.
1999,

On Tuesday,

April 6,

the WTO Dispute Settlement Board again ruled that the

EU banana rules were discriminatory and in violation of WTO

3

rules.

The ruling allowed for the United States to impose

sanctions of up to US$191 million in retaliatory tariffs on
imports.

Although the United States had asked for up to

US$520 million,
Friday,

the ruling was still a clear victory.

April 9,

the United States imposed 100 percent

tariff duty on nine products,
coffee makers and tea pots,

including French handbags,

except those made in Italy,

lithographs printed not more than twenty years ago,
linens,

That

bath preparations,

bed

electric batteries and cardboard

packing cartons and uncoated felt paper.2

Ironically,

the

list of imports ended up severely crippling many small
American businesses:

larger American corporations had

previously lobbied the USTR to remove items that would
affect their business from the list. 3
Why did then,

did the United States react in such a

manner, imposing a list of dozens of retaliatory tariffs
that greatly harmed some small American businesses?
European banana industry threatened little,
American jobs,

The

if any,

and the only domestic American banana

industry that exists to be threatened by the preferential
regime is a small market in Hawaii,
local consumption.

which is primarily for

The American Congressional Black Caucus

and several lobbying groups argued that removing the
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preference system would destroy the tiny Eastern Caribbean
island economies that hinge upon their trade with Europe.
Furthermore,

it is vital to remember that the

discriminatory trade preferences in questions amounted to
less than ten percent of the overall European banana trade.
Given these circumstances,

why did the United States react

as it did?
A brief historiographical review reveals that the
United States was in fact acting in an almost textbook
manner.

Milner argues that policy is inextricably formed

by the negotiations that occur between various
individuals, groups and institutions within a nation.
Robert Putnam takes the idea a step further,

with the image

of foreign policy as a game that occurs simulanteously at
two levels,

or if you will,

According to Putnam,

at two separate boards.

the national leader appears at each

board surrounded by various groups of actors.

At the

domestic level, the national leader must juggle the
interests of the party,
other interest groups,
international level,

other politicians,

corporate and

and the electorate. At the

the leader must balance the nation's

domestic interests with the nation's international position
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and relations.
relations,

Moreover, both games,

or spheres of

occur simultaneously.

It is the contention of this thesis that the United
States pursued this trade war to satisfy dual interests at
both levels or spheres.

On the domestic level,

it

acquiesced to pressure from Chiquita Banana International,
after intense lobbying by Chiquita's chairman Carl Lindner,
who marshaled key members of Congress to his cause.
Internationally,

the Caribbean's involvement in the issue

served as an opportunity for the United States to further
solidify America's economic position against the European
Union.
American politics have always been strongly influenced
by lobbying interests. A constant stream of money and
favors provided by Chiquita Brand International's CEO,
Lindner,

and his political action committee,

Lindner first

Karl

brought

the attention of key members of Congress,

then the President,
Trade Representative

and finally the United States Office of
(USTR). Domestically,

U.S.

officials

were able to reward a corporation and its officers for its
decade-long multi-million dollar support.
importantly,

Most

in bringing an almost guaranteed-win case to

the WTO against Europe,

globally,
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the United States was

able to assert economic power over Europe.

Economically,

Europe and the increasingly evolving European Union pose
the first serious challenge to American hegemony in a postCold War era,

and such a reality naturally places the

United States on the defensive.

The banana issue was

attractive to the United States for several reasons.
First,
allies,

since Europe and the United States are such close
the banana dispute served to be a relatively minor

issue for both parties,

and importantly, was an issue where

the two did not meet directly, but through the Caribbean.
The United States placed itself as the wronged third party
within the trio.

The regime had already been ruled in

violation of both GATT and WTO rules,
completely dismantled,

but had yet to be

and it assured Washington a

relatively easy victory.

The banana trade rules are an

important issue for the Eastern Caribbean island nations,
whose economies depend on the industry. The manner in which
these islands were treated however,

throughout this dispute

suggests an indication of how smaller economies can easily
be lost in the fray of the globalized economy,

especially

since the region lacks strategic importance for the United
States,

particularly in the late 1990s. Altogether,

U.S.'s view,

pursuing the case was a minimal risk,
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in the
minimal

loss situation.

In terms of its action,

the United States

acted as a state would be expected to in terms of the
politics of trade:
external,

the United States fulfilled internal and

domestic and international

interests

simultaneously.

The Banana
It should actually come as no surprise that such a
furor erupted over the industry. Bananas have fast grown to
be the most popular fruit in the world.
easily produced

(crops grow year-round)

excellent source of energy,
B6.

As an export,

They are cheap,
and are an

containing vitamins A,

C and

bananas are the world's fourth most

important commodity.6

Latin America and the Caribbean,

far the largest world exporters of bananas,

by

produced

32,785,888 metric tons of bananas and plantains in 1998.'
Banana production takes place in three main stages:
growing, packing,

and transporting.

In the Caribbean,

cultivation is undertaken on small plantations.

the

The

picking of the fruit is timed to coincide with the arrival
of refrigerated freighters that transport the fruit to
Europe.

The bananas are boxed and packed in the Caribbean,

then maintained at approximately 56-570 and then transported
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to ripening centers in Europe, where within four to six
days they are suitable for sale to the general public. Once
inside a grocery,

a banana has a shelf life of 24 to 28

hours.
In Europe,

the total market for 1997 was 3.5 million

tons of bananas, nearly double the amount from 1984.8
1991,

In

the overall world banana market was worth US$5.1

billion.

And as such,

business.

of course,

this translates into big

Keith Nurse and Wayne Sandiford,

the course of banana production,

when detailing

point out that it is a

highly capitalized business best suited to large-scale
corporations.9

In the Eastern Caribbean,

the purchasing

process is dominated by two major corporations,

that

purchase the fruit and then transport it to an importing
nation:

Fyffes and Geest Bananas,

the latter of which the

West Indian Banana Development and Export Corporation
(WIBDECO), maintains 50 percent ownership.
America,

In Latin

the major transnational growers and purchasers are

Chiquita Brands International

(CBI), Dole and Fresh Del

Monte Produce Inc.
In 1990,

these Latin American corporations accounted

for about 75 percent of all world exports."

In 1996,

Latin America exported 10,400,473 metric tons of bananas,
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compared with the Caribbean's 281,785 metric tons.'

The

Latin American banana industry dominates the market for
several

reasons.

First,

the industry operates on a vastly

larger economy of scale than the Eastern Caribbean island
nations.

Their plantations and work force are huge and

highly efficient:
If islands like St. Lucia are the corner stores of the
banana business - chaotic, friendly and unreliable - the
Latin American plantations are the Wal-Mart at the edge of
town.
They cover hundreds of square miles of ideally flat
and fertile soil. They are served by railways and
cableways, by proper irrigation, efficient refrigeration,
and a scrupulously organised workforce working to quality
standards and production targets set down by the companies.
Productivity, at around 24 tons an acre, is three times as
high as St. Lucia, and cost to importers of these "dollar
bananas" is half as much.
Workers, many of them migrants
on short contracts, are paid only half or a quarter of the
income of farmers in St. Lucia."

The Latin American market also produces bananas that
are uniform,
colored,

perfectly standard and consistently shaped and

reflecting today's consumer's preference.

to all produce,

Similar

the bananas that sell best today are the

ones that are consistent.

Just as perfectly shaped, bright

red or green apples are the production norm; bright,
yellow,

perfectly curved bananas are what sell,

as

reflected in a 1994 Brussels Euro-norm decree that limited
bananas to being at least 27mm wide,
"abnormal" curvature.
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14 cm long and with no

History

of the Industry
It is indeed true that to examine the history of

bananas is to mirror the history of colonialism.
Commercial banana production began in Latin America at the
beginning of the last century, where Chiquita Brands
International,

then known as the United Fruit Company,

which gave rise to the term banana republic for the
company's control of Central American's political and
economic spheres.
In the Caribbean, bananas replaced sugar as the "green
gold"

in the early twentieth century.

By 1925,

a United

Fruit subsidiary folded due to a high incidence of disease.
Hurricanes during the 1930s similarly killed off the
industry.

It was not revived again until the

1950s,

with

the production centering in Jamaica and the Antilles,

including the Windward Islands and the French islands of
Martinique and Guadeloupe.

Jamaica dominated the

Caribbean banana trade until the 1960s,
faded due to crop disease.

when its industry

The Eastern Caribbean islands

found during that time that their geographic location
afforded them several days advantage over Jamaica during
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transportion to Europe,

and the Windward Island industry

began to take off.
The European countries originally encouraged the
banana industry among its colonies to help smooth out the
balance of payments between the nations.
original 1975 Lome conventions,
preferences was created.

During the

the first set of

Ironically,

even at that time the

idea of preferences for the colonial countries was
contentious,

being the last issue to be agreed upon during

the 1957 Treaty of Rome signing. 5

The preferences were

extended to the colonial African,

Caribbean and Pacific

(ACP) nations.

of course,

Of the ACP states,

the Protocol

primarily applied to those banana-producing nations of the
Caribbean: the formerly British-owned Eastern Caribbean
island nations of Antigua,
Vincent and the Grenadines,

Grenada,

St.

Lucia and St.

and the still-French owned

Martinique and Guadeloupe.
While over time the protocol has undergone several
revisions,

the basic tenor of the agreement remains the

same.

A preferential market exists in Britain,

Spain,

Italy,

Germany,

France,

Portugal and Greece for ACP nations.

the entire market is duty-free.
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In Denmark,

In

Luxembourg,

Belgium,

the Netherlands and Ireland,

market is subject to a 20 percent

the

tariff.16

In preferential market countries,

preference is given

to ACP banana imports over the Latin American bananas in
several ways.
free entry;

First,

any ACP-produced bananas are allowed

Latin American bananas,

in contrast, are

subject to a tariff and quota system,
line with demand.

Second,

adjusted monthly in

a partnership agreement exists

that allow traditional ACP importers to receive licenses to
import most Latin American bananas.

Finally,

the protocol

contains a safeguard clause which allows the Latin American
quota to be completely adjusted if traditional supplies are
disrupted,

although at present this quota permits three

times the volume of bananas from Latin America than from
the Eastern Caribbean.17
Yet the American companies had reason to complain,
despite the fact that statistically,

the Caribbean has

always comprised a fairly small share of the overall
European banana market,

just around 10 percent.'8 The one

exception is the United Kingdom,

where the Caribbean banana

has held between fifty to sixty percent of that country's
market since the 1960s.19
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Although the United States brought the complaint
ostensibly on behalf of both American multinational banana
companies,

Chiquita, Del Monte and Dole,

Dole was

noticeably silent about the issue, because Dole had
arranged to acquire bananas from countries within the
preferential system.

Several observers have suggested that

Chiquita's failure to succeed in the European Market had
little do with the EU's market scheme and more to do with
poor management.0 In fact,

the company's performance over

the past decade is probably a result of its management
decisions,

decreased market share due to its competitors,

and the European preferential market.
1994,

Nevertheless,

in

after Chiquita filed a petition with the USTR

alleging that the EU scheme had cost
in lost revenue,

it millions of dollars

the United States began its full-fledged

effort on behalf of all American banana corporations and
the Latin American countries involved to have the regime
dismantled.

Theoretical

framework

The distinction is often made in international
relations theory that the state is not to be considered as
a unitary actor.

21

While the state works as a single

14

entity in terms of action,
singular policy,

i.e.,

in terms of formulating a

such as a fiscal or foreign policy,

there

are influences upon the decision-making process that must
coincide and agree

(or disagree)

to create an outcome.

It is Helen Milner's contention that a state's
actions,

particularly in regards to foreign policy,

viewed through the prism of the interests,
institutions of the state.
not unitary,

must be

information, and

Milner argues that the state is

but rather polyarchic, more like a network of

sorts:
No single group sits at the top; power or authority over
decision making is shared, often unequally. Relations among
groups in polyarchy entail reciprocal influence and/or the
parceling out of distinct powers among groups.2 2

These groups interact with each other in a dynamic
that shapes the outcome,

Milner writes.

This is obviously

more true for some forms of government than others,
even in a dictatorship,

but

the dictator generally relies upon

some group or individual to maintain power over the masses,
e.g.,

a military or secret police.

In the United States,

this notion of a polyarchic system is certainly applicable,
as it goes to the very heart of the American governmental
structure: a presidential form of representative democracy
tempered by a system of check and balances,
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with power to

the legislative and judicial branches.

In the United

States, much like most other forms of democracy,
branches share power.
United States,

Institutionally,

according to Milner,

therefore,

all three
the

is already polyarchic

in nature.
Policies and laws are of course not simply influenced
by politicians,
politicians,

but by the voters,

and have the power to oust them,

equally important,
blunt,

who elect the

by special

interest groups,

fund the politicians.

groups under the rubric of

to be

"interests and information."

or by their interests.

some people always vote Democratic,
ideology,

who,

but

Milner incorporates these

Often the electorate is motivated by ideas,
for ideology,

and last,

another term

For example, while
following a particular

others may vote simply on the issue of abortion,

following a specific interest.

All of the groups within

the polyarchy are motivated by different interests and
information,
manifested.

and the institutions are where they are
It is important to point out here,

though,

that

Milner makes the distinction that while interest groups may
influence the decision-making process,

they are not

directly involved in the formulation of a decision.
shown in subsequent chapters,

As

Milner may be incorrect in
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her contention that special interests do not help to
formulate government decisions.
Since this study is specifically concerned with the
politics of trade policy,

that is,

the ideas,

interests and

institutions that shape American trade policy,
in this particular game need to be examined.

the actors
Frederick

Mayer presents three operating questions to begin his
study:

one must ask,

he says,

what is the game,

players and how do they play?2 3

who are the

Mayer defines several

groups whose interactions together determine American trade
policy:

the U.S.

branch,

including the President and departments that fall

Congress and its members;

under the executive jurisdiction,

the Executive

such as the United States

Office of the Trade Representative

(USTR); other

commissions which are quasi-dependent on both branches:
finally,

but certainly not least influential,

and

corporate,

union and other special interest groups.
When examining the politics of American trade,
foremost is the seminal work by E.E.
Politics,
work,

Pressure

and the Tariff.

24

Schattschneider,

Schattschneider's

published not long after the infamous Smoot-Hawley

Tariff of 1930,

argued that tariff was enacted in Congress

because of domestic political pressures despite advice to

17

the contrary.

The tariff,

the highest at the time ever

enacted by the United States,

led,

as economists predicted,

to a domino effect of protectionism,

with 26 other

countries immediately enacting similar legislation and
eventually encouraging a massive worldwide depression.
Thus we have then a picture of the trading state and
the many factors of which it is comprised.

This study has

already outlined the first level of analysis when
determining how trade policy is formulated:

the internal,

or domestic groups and their interests as played out in the
institutions of the state.

That said,

though,

another

layer is necessary to make the level-of-analysis
conceptualization complete.
It is fundamental first to recognize that any
international or external policy is inextricably related to
a state's domestic concerns.

One cannot consider foreign

policy without an understanding of domestic policy.
already demonstrated from prior analysis Schattschneider,

25

As

e.g.,

who argued that it was domestic pressures

that led to the United States enacting the 1930 tariff.
fully consider the politics of trade policy,

To

one must

consider not only domestic actors but also those in the
international arena.

In fact,

even as a variety of actors
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exist internally,

others exist externally,

and the game is

therefore played simultaneously both domestically and
internationally.
Robert Putnam uses the illusion of two game boards to
explain this multiple-level nature of international

diplomacy:
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their
interest by pressuring the government to adopt
favorable policies, and politicians seek power by
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the
international level, national governments seek to
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences
of foreign developments...Each national political leader
appears at both game boards. Across the international
table sit his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows
sit diplomats and other international advisors. Around
the domestic table behind him sit party and
parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic
agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and
the leader's own political advisors.

Putnam sees the game,

and the process,

as decisions that

must be made to function on two levels simultaneously. The
state's actions must fulfill dual interests: on both the
internal and external,

domestic and foreign.

Perhaps it is

best to conceive of the state as operating in two
simultaneous spheres of decision-making and influence:
the domestic and the international.
satisfy pressures from both,

A

both

state's actions must

and operate equally

successfully in both spheres.

Putnam builds his analysis
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further with the idea of win-sets,

that is,

a majority of

groups or individuals within the domestic sphere that favor
a specific outcome at the international level.
the win-set,

Putnam reasons,

the greater the support and

chance of success at the international level,
brings to the table more support

A

The larger

as the leader

from the domestic arena.

rational explanation for U.S.

actions during the

recent WTO banana dispute must involve these dual
interests,

i.e.,

the situation must be viewed in light of

both the domestic and international pressures faced by the
United States in the situation.

This thesis will detail

the multi-level nature of this decade-long dispute over the
Windward Island banana industry between the United States,
the Latin American countries and the European Community
nations.
Again,
is the game,

to reiterate Mayer's operating questions: what
who are the players,

and how do they play?

Clearly in this case study the focus is on the politics of
trade revolving around the U.S.
complaint to the WTO.

decision to bring a

The first half of the work focuses

on the first level of the game: the internal or the
domestic pressures.

Here the actors are not just the White
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House,

Congress,

Representative,
groups.

and the Office of the Trade
but also the all-important special

interest

In this particular case, Chiquita Brands CEO Carl

Lindner extensively lobbied various members of the American
government.

As detailed in chapter two,

Lindner operated

in the position of a high-powered businessman,
regular,

whose

extensive political favors and contributions

granted him easy and immediate,

personal access to high-

level officials, including President Bill Clinton.
The second half of this study details the second
level,

the external or international sphere of the case.

Here the picture quickly becomes much more complex simply
because the actors have multiplied.
only the European Union,
islands.

At this level sits not

but also the Eastern Caribbean

Thus analysis must also look not only at the

European Union's relations to the Caribbean,
colonies,

its former

as specifically seen in the case of the United

Kingdom and the Eastern Caribbean island nations, but also
at how the Eastern Caribbean relates to the United States.
Previously the Eastern Caribbean looked to Europe for its
primary economic support.

During the Cold War the United

States was increasingly concerned with the islands,
have remained largely peaceful,
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stable democracies.

which
In the

post-Cold War era,

how do relations stand between the

Caribbean and the United States, and how does this
particular incident fit into the broader scheme of
American-Caribbean relations?

Finally,

this sphere also

looks at recent American-European relations,

arguing that

the United States used this case to assert its power over
Europe.

These banana trade rules were a dispute that

virtually guaranteed the United States a victory from the
start, and the Eastern Caribbean was simply caught in the
crossfire.

Trinidad Sunday Guardian, Feb. 16, 1999.
2 Associated Press, April 9,
1999, "U.S. Issues Sanction List in banana
fight with Europe," and Wall Street Journal articles, April 12, 1999,
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Chapter Two
THE DOMESTIC SPHERE:
the White House and Corporate interests

Returning to Putnam's sphere framework,
sphere exists a variety of actors,

each of which interact

and negotiate to reach an outcome.
politics of U.S.

trade policy,

within each

In the case of the

as already discussed,

there

are several groups of actors within the domestic or
internal sphere:

Congress,

of the Trade Representative
also interest groups.

the White House,
(USTR).

and the Office

Of course,

there are

More recent works have shown that

the American political system is inextricably linked to
interest groups, which act as lobbyists that provide
financial and other favors in order to gain access and
influence with American politicians.

In this case study,

it was the corporate interest group of Chiquita Banana,

led

by CEO Carl Lindner, whose successful lobbying efforts
brought this case to the attention of the USTR, with the
help of key members of Congress and the White House.

Chi qui ta's

Dominance

In a survey released just before the beginning of the
year 2000,

Chiquita Bananas made the top "American Brands

of the Nineties"

list,

following Mercedes-Benz cars,
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Disney

World and others,
surprising,

and beating out Levi Jeans.'

This is not

since 65 percent of American households buy

bananas each week,

many adorned with the bright blue and

yellow "Miss Chiquita" label.
well-recognized symbol,

The Chiquita banana is a

in large measure because its chief

executive officer, Carl Lindner,

has worked to make it so.

Certainly Lindner has behind him an impressive
corporate history.

Chiquita celebrated its

1 0 0 th

birthday

in 1999. Chiquita is actually a modern incarnation of
United Brands Fruit Company

(UFCO), the corporation that

gave rise to the term "banana republic" and was given the
nickname el pulpo,

or the octopus,

influence in Central America.2

because of its tenacious

The most infamous incident

in UFCO's history occurred in 1954,

with a CIA-backed

effort in Guatemala that resulted in an UFCO friendly
regime.
After taking the helm of Chiquita in 1988,

Lindner

began to extensively lobby on behalf of the company.
recent years,

In

his lobbying earned him a place on President

Bill Clinton's top donor list in 1994,

and an invitation

for an overnight stay in the Lincoln Bedroom in 1995.
Lindner was also extended an invitation to a State Dinner
and Vice-president Al Gore's White House coffees,
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both of

which Lindner accepted. 3

Why did Lindner,

a Republican and

devout Baptist who traditionally was a strong financial
supporter of the Republican party,

donate so much money to

a Democratic party and a Democratic White House?

The American Lobbying System
While it has been often perceived that lobbying
efforts in America are a recent development,

the reality is

that the relationship between big business and politics is
not a new one,

just one that is better documented in

contemporary times.

As previously discussed,

in 1935

Schattschneider detailed how the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930
was a tariff enacted largely because of political
pressures. Likewise,

American president Woodrow Wilson

called special interests, their bosses and employees an
"invisible empire"
democracy".

4

that has been set up "above the forms of

It has been estimated that Lindner,

and members of Chiquita Brands International,

his family

donated

approximately $7.1 million in a successful campaign to
encourage the administration of the United States to bring
the case to the World Trade Organization.
million,

Of that $7.1

an estimated $4.2 million was given to the
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Republicans,

$1.4 to the Democrats,

and an additional $1.5

million to Washington lobbyists.5
Lewis suggests that the presidential campaign is not
so much a beauty contest or a horse race but an "auction".
While that may be overstating the point,

there is no doubt

that money is an important factor in an American
politician's success.

For example,

in 1995,

for the 1996

American presidential election to be considered a viable
candidate,

each person needed to raise $20 million just

during the primaries. 7

The most recent presidential

primaries for the 2000 race saw Republican candidate George
W.

Bush spending $60 million during the primaries,

him the party's nomination.

assuring

Several potential candidates

were so discouraged at the thought of needing to raise such
a large amount of money
in raising such funds)

(as well as the activities involved
that they no longer seriously

consider entering the presidential race.
individual,

One such

former Housing Secretary Jack Kemp,

declined to

run for the Republican party's nomination in 1995 after
learning that he would need to appear in 200 to 250
fundraisers to develop the money and connections to run a
viable campaign.

Kemp said he decided that rather than

spending 50 percent of his time on fundraisers,
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he prefer

to fight for a cause he believed in.8

By contrast,

as seen

in the failed 1996 presidential campaign by
multimillionaire Ross Perot,

and more recently,

in the

equally unsuccessful 2000 presidential campaign bids by
multimillionaire Steve Forbes

(millionaire tycoon Donald

Trump also was rumored to have considered running for the
Reform party)

all of whom had little,

experience prior to the campaign,
opposite were true. That is,

if any,

political

it almost seems as if the

for some,

simply having enough

money to run a political campaign is qualification enough

by itself for elective office.
On a smaller scale,

depending on the state,

Congressional campaigns have similar financial
requirements.
New York,
Guliani,

In the much-contested 2000 Senate race in

at the beginning of the year candidates Rudolph
the mayor of New York City,

and First Lady Hillary

Rodham Clinton had already broken the fundraising record,
with Guliani raising $12
election committee,
hers.

million for his senatorial

and Clinton collecting $8 million for

Guliani has also hosted $50,000 per couple

fundraising dinners.9
While the average American does contribute some to
Presidential and Congressional campaigns, or to specific
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parties,

the majority of campaign funds are obtained from

corporations or other lobbying organizations.
adopted after the Nixon Watergate scandal

Federal

law

limits

individuals to a maximum donation of a $25,000 a year:
$20,000 to a national party,
committee

(PAC)

$5,000 to a political action

and $2,000 per candidate,

per cycle,

allowing for one donation during the primary and another
during the general election.
"hard" money.

This is often referred to as

Corporations and unions are not permitted to

give money directly to federal candidates.

But they skirt

these rules by contributing through what is referred to as
"soft" money donations:
unlimited,

contributions that are legal and

money that any corporation, union,

PAC or

individual can make to national party committees,
the Democratic National Committee
National Committee

such as

(DNC) or the Republican

(RNC). These funds are to be used for

so-called party-building activities.'0

Corporations also

often donate money through PACs established in their name.

Chi qui t a's Lobbying Campaign
Lindner and his family channel much of their money
through their PAC,

the American Financial Group

political action committee.

(AFG)

American Financial is the
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holding company for many of the Lindner family's business
interests.

In 1988,

it was through AFG,

an insurance

company whose subsidiaries include Great American Insurance
Company and the American Annuity Group,

that Lindner bought

up 87 percent of United Brand Co.'s outstanding shares and
had himself installed as chief executive officer."
the year 2000,

As of

the Lindner family owned the largest share

of United Brands,

now renamed as Chiquita Brands,

or about

44 percent of the company.
Chiquita executives themselves have repeatedly
denounced any suggestion that lobbying efforts on their
part had improperly influenced the USTR's involvement in
the banana case.
the case,

To imply that Lindner is responsible for

the Company has said,

is to "blame Chiquita for

seeking to have trade laws enforced instead of blaming the
European Union for breaking the laws."' 2

The Company also

emphasized that five developing countries joined Chiquita
in bringing the dispute,

saying that:

American and Latin American businesses have suffered
hundreds of million of dollars in lost business, while
the true winners have been a handful of influential
European banana marketing companies. Chiquita's share
of the European market was reduced by over 50 percent
as a result of Europe's illegal practices...These [GATT
and WTO] decisions were based on the rule of law and
made by GATT and WTO representative with no commercial
interest in the dispute. 3
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While it may not be possible to prove a direct connection
between the money Lindner and his company donated and the
fact that the United States brought the case against the EU
banana regime to the WTO,

the coincidence of key company

donations and access granted to the White House and the
USTR is indisputable.

In 1991, Lindner had donated a scant $4,000 to the
Democratic party,

and $37,000 to the Republicans.

company was beginning to perform poorly.

CBI as a

In 1992,

it

posted its first loss under Lindner, a loss from continuing
operations of $221.7 million.

Losses continued in this

area until 1998, with the exception of 1995 and 1997,
during which time gains were $28 million and $.3
respectively.

From 1992 to 1994,

million,

its stock went from $40

to $11 a share.
Chiquita,
and Del Monte,

along with other large multinationals Dole
had in 1990 accounted for 75 percent of the

world market through its dollar, or Latin American bananas.
Chiquita had the largest share with 35 percent,

followed by

Dole with 20 percent and Del Monte with 15 percent.
In the early 1990s,

the transnationals were well aware

of the European Union's continued determination to pursue
its preferential practices extended especially to the ACP
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The

nations under Lome.
was called,

"New Banana Regime,"

so when it took effect on July 1,

1993, came as no surprise.
around the NBR.

Dole,

Other companies simply worked

for example,

through countries whose fruit

accept.

as it

took several years to develop and was a fairly

transparent process,

bananas

(NBR)

(Ironically, Dole,

had arranged to acquire
it

knew the EU would

is in fact a modern incarnation

of Standard Fruit, which was created after the antitrust
breakup of United Brands at the beginning of the century.)'5
During the 1980s, Chiquita had acquired a subsidiary of
Fyffes,

one of the two banana corporations that dominated

the Caribbean trade, and therefore had unrestricted access
into the European market.

Yet in 1986, Chiquita sold off

its Fyffes subsidiary, thereby closing down on possible
entry into the European market.'6

In 1992, under Lindner's direction, while the new
banana rules were being negotiated, Chiquita had
oversupplied the market,
position.

intending to improve its relative

Once the NBR rules took effect in 1993,

strategy backfired.'7
Del Monte and Dole,

this

The result was that in the mid 1990s,

despite the new banana regime,

actually

increased their combined share of the overall European
market,

even though the overall market share by the big
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three had fallen from 43.5 percent in 1991 to 41.5 percent

in 1994. Chiquita was doubly battered by the overall
decrease of the market share and by its competitors'

increasingly successful ability, at Chiquita's expense,
survive in the European market.

to

It is important to note

here that despite these decreases the big three still

retained the dominant share of the overall European market.
Chiquita, similarly, maintained a share of the market of
almost 20 percent,

compared with the Caribbean islands'

10

percent.

Yet Chiquita officials blamed the company's losses
solely on the preferential rules.
Steven Warshaw,

European regime,
of Chiquita's

Chiquita's president,

attributed the company's losses to the

saying the "illegal regime" was the cause

"poor financial results since 1992."18

While

again, the preferential regime was surely a cause of the
company's losses, certainly Dole and Del Monte's respective
growth, combined with the strategies Chiquita had
undertaken in the early 1990s,
contributing factors.
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also could be considering

The Senate

Chiquita commenced its crusade to get the rules
rescinded through the usual means, by writing the
government's trade office requesting that an inquiry be
made.

When that move proved unsuccessful,

the company

stepped up the pressure; Chiquita used its already
established network among Republican supporters to gain
entry into the White House and the USTR. Several prominent
senators were to advocate on Chiquita's behalf
House:

Senators Bob Dole,

John Glenn,

Trent Lott,

in the White

Richard Lugar and

all of whom advocated publicly and privately

for the company.
Initially,

though, it appears that the family's

requests to the USTR went unnoticed;

internal USTR memos

indicate the issue was of a low priority.19 In 1993, Carl
Lindner's son,

Keith,

a letter to the USTR,

the vice-president of Chiquita,
at the time,

wrote

led by Mickey Kantor,

asking for immediate sanctions to be imposed upon the EU.
Kantor had little response. Several months later, Carl
contributed a quarter of a million dollars to the
Democratic National Committee. At around the same time,
Congressional representatives began to put additional
pressure on the White House.

In January of 1994,
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Senators

Dole,

Glenn and Lugar wrote a letter to President Clinton.

In it,

they called for Clinton to make it clear to European

Union officials that export quotas and licenses were "not
an acceptable solution.
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The Lindners began to rally support among these U.S.
Congressman, particularly Republicans like Bob Dole, a
Republican from Kansas who had held first the Minority then
Majority leadership position in the Senate,
1996,

when he resigned to run for president.

from 1985 until
Dole had such

close relations with Chiquita that he had used the
company's corporate jet during several presidential
campaign bids.1

Later on, Dole's successor as Majority

leader Sen. Trent Lott, a Republican from Mississippi, was
to take up Chiquita's cause. Chiquita's headquarters are in
Cincinnati, Ohio, and Ohio's Democrat senator John Glenn,
the former astronaut and at the time chairman of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs,

was another supporter.

Also backing Chiquita was Indiana Republican Senator
Richard Lugar, who had served as chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations and in the 105th Congressional

legislature,

in 2000, as the chairman of the Committee on

Agriculture.
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At the same time,

Lindner began to shift his political

contributions to the Democratic party.

In 1994,

Lindner and

his family members personally contributed $255,000 to
presidential campaigns, the bulk of which,

$250,000, was

given to the Democratic party, marking a significant shift
in their giving pattern of contributions.

Prior to 1994,

the bulk of Lindner and company contributions went to the
GOP.

The USTR and the White House
The Trade Office averages about five investigations
into charges of discriminatory trade practices a year,

and

the banana dispute was the first investigation ever
undertaken in which the company involved was not a direct
U.S.

exporter,

that is,

the bananas were not being exported

from the United States, but third party countries,
Honduras.

In an internal USTR memo,

such as

two staff members said

acknowledged that the investigation, if initiated, would be
the first

of its kind.

The USTR could, and did, claim jurisdiction under
section 301 of the 1974 U.S.
sent the

joint

Trade Act.

The senators who

letter in January 1994 were asking that the

USTR do just that,

to invoke section 301,
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which allows the

USTR authority to intervene if American interests are
threatened by foreign trade practices and to impose
sanctions upon the offending states.
In September 1994,

Carl Lindner was able to have his

first meeting with Kantor.
his Washington residence,

It was hosted by Bob Dole at
the Watergate Hotel,

second meeting between Kantor and Lindner. 2
17,
301.

1994,

as was the

On October,

Kantor authorized the investigation under section

In an announcement about the complaint,

Kantor said

that "the discriminatory practices of the European Union
have already cost U.S.

banana marketing and distribution

firms hundreds of dollars at a minimum."

Additionally, he

said that the EU had been inflexible in attempting to
address the U.S.

companies'

That same week,

legitimate concerns.24

Lindner attended a White House dinner

as a guest of President Clinton. A week later,
president Al Gore called Lindner,
By November 3,
AFG.

asking for a donation.

Lindner had donated another $50,000 through

The same day,

Holding Corp.,

the Vice-

another Lindner company,

donated $25,000,

and American Money

Management added an additional $25,000.
Lindner contributed,

Great American

Altogether,

through those corporations,

to the DNC in a single day.

By the end of 1994,

37

$100,000
Lindner,

his family and members of his corporation had contributed
more than half a million dollars--$446,000 to the
Republicans,

and $254,000 to the Democrats.

On January 9,

1995,

the USTR released a preliminary

report, which said that the office had decided the EU
regime did harm United States interests.
process,

Throughout the

Lindner continued to contribute to both the

Democrat and Republican parties.

His combined giving was

sufficient enough to place him at the number two spot of

Clinton's top donors list,
1995,

and as such,

on February 9,

after attending a state dinner in honor of German

Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Lindner was an overnight guest at
the White House.

Within two weeks,

he was back at the

White House again for coffee, a privilege reserved only for
the exceedingly well-connected. 26

Hawaii Banana Association strengthens the case
As Lindner continued giving money,

his case was

further strengthened by the Hawaii Banana Industry
Association.
bananas,

Hawaii is the only state that produces

and it does so primarily for internal consumption

within the islands.

According to the United Nations Food

and Agriculture Office

(FAO), the United States produced
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6.2 million metric tons of bananas and plantains in 1998,

the fourth to last in volume for the region,
by the Bahamas,
Ecuador,

Grenada and Barbados. By way of comparison,

by far the largest banana producer,

produced 8.3 billion metric tons,
smaller exporter,
United States,

followed only

and St.

in 1998

Lucia,

a much

produced 77.7 million metric tons.2

according to the FAO,

The

did not produce any

bananas for export. Yet the Hawaiian industry did have a
slight case for the WTO, though, in arguing that the
restricted European banana prices had forced some dollar
bananas into Hawaii's market, driving down local prices.
On May 8,

1996,

the United States Office of the Trade

Representative formally presented its case to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Board
the case was initiated,

(DSB). In a position paper on why
the USTR argued that the regime

discriminated against the American transnational
corporations, which were under WTO rules allowed open
access to these markets.

The USTR further argued that the

rules discriminated against the Latin American banana
producing countries,
From 1994,
early 1996,

hurting the Latin American economies.

when the investigation was initiated,

when the formal case was announced,

until

Lindner and

his associates had given more than $1.3 million to various
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members of the American government,
and in the U.S.

Senate.

both in the White House

By early 1998,

Senate Majority

Leader Trent Lott publicly joined Carl Lindner's campaign.
In June,

Lott had sent a letter to Charlene Barshefsky,

Kantor's successor.

In July,

Lott held a press conference

to add his support to the issue,

and in so doing,

continued

to place pressure upon the White House and the USTR.

Lott

said at the press conference that the United States should

"protect the rights of our workers," regardless of that the
fact that there were no American industry workers involved,
and urged that the United States retaliate against the

banana regime."

Conclusion
The domestic sphere of U.S.
several groups,

trade politics includes

including among them elected officials,

government bureaucrats and interest groups,

interact to help formulate policy.

all of whom

In the specific case of

the banana trade dispute, the particular actors included
among them key members of the U.S.
Senate Majority Leaders,

Congress,

including two

Bob Dole and Trent Lott,

Clinton White House and the USTR,

including Representatives

Mickey Kantor and Charlene Barshefsky,
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the

and the corporate

interest group of Chiquita Bananas,

represented by its CEO

Carl Lindner.

The American political system has been inundated with
financial contributions from corporate or other special
interest groups.

Finance contribution rules adopted after

the Watergate scandal have done little to curb large-scale
giving.

Soft money contributions from corporations and

other special interest groups are what fund electoral
campaigns,
As such,

at almost every level of the federal government.

politicians find themselves courting the money-

givers during campaigns,

and the interest groups buy access

to politicians and develop relationships that continue
after the candidate has been elected to office.
It has been estimated that Lindner, who is a

Republican,

spent $7.1 million in lobbying efforts to

encourage the U.S. government to bring the banana case to
the WTO.

Prior to his 1993 shift to giving to the

Democratic party, when donating primarily to the Republican
party Lindner's requests for a USTR investigation had been

virtually ignored. Lindner then began his intensive
lobbying campaign by utilizing the connections he had
already established with Republican politicians such as Bob
Dole,

so closely tied to Lindner that Dole had used the
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Lindner corporate

campaign.

jet

during his unsuccessful presidential

It was Bob Dole who hosted the first meeting

between Lindner and USTR Mickey Kantor.
Lindner became a top Clinton donor,

Eventually,

which in return

resulted in invitations to a State Dinner,

a sleepover in

the Lincoln Bedroom, and coffee at the White House.

At key

points in formulating the policy, Lindner donated enormous
amounts to the Democratic party,

some of it by personal

request from the Clinton White House,

including current

presidential candidate Vice President Al Gore.
As a result of these combined efforts,
initiated an investigation in 1994,

the USTR first

and by 1996 had

formally presented its case against the European banana
regime to the World Trade Organization.

It was the first

trade dispute of its kind that America had ever undertaken
--

it did not involve any American jobs, and affected

virtually no American industry,

save a weak and indirect

connection to the Hawaiian banana industry, grown for
internal consumption.

' chiquita Brands International, press release, Dec. 22, 1999
The term "banana republic" is a derisive term usually applied toward
Latin American countries, initially coined because it was viewed, and
often rightly so, that chiquita the corporation, backed by the military
and political support of the United states government, essentially
economically and politically controlled various central American
countries.
2
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During the 35 state primaries which run between February and March of
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8 Lewis,

1996,

p.

12.
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own," The New York Times, March 15, 2000.
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Chapter Three
THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE:
Dependency, Domination and Flux

The international politics of the banana trade dispute
becomes complicated because of the variety of actors and
their pre-existing relationships. Unlike the domestic
sphere,

where the actors are individuals or groups of

individuals,

in the international sphere the actors are

nations, or groups of nations.

The international dimension

of the dispute involves three sets of relationships:
and the Caribbean,

Europe

the Caribbean and the United States, and

finally, the United States and Europe.
To examine the roots of the particular case,

it is

necessary to first look to the colonial origins of the

current preferential banana trade agreements and its effect
on the relationship between the Eastern Caribbean islands
and Europe.

The second relationship is that of the Eastern

Caribbean, or the English-speaking Caribbean on the whole,
and its relationship with the United States.
relationship,

certainly not one of paramount importance to

the United States,
War era,

has become even less so in the post-Cold

and consequently has shaped the U.S.

the dispute.

This

response to

Finally, the most important relationship for

the United States with regard to this case was the
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relationship between itself and the European Union,

if only

because of the precedent-setting nature of the particular
dispute.

As the European Community continues to evolve,

it

presents a serious threat to America in the new millennium.
As such,

the two allies are undergoing a state of flux in

their relations.

The banana dispute represents the first

instance of this strain,

as a result of which the tiny

Eastern Caribbean island nations appeared to be caught in
the crossfire between the two superpowers.

Europe and the Caribbean: Colonialism and Dependency
According to Nurse and Sandiford,

the West

Indian

island nations fit the classic definition of "peripheral"
states.

The idea of peripheral economies and states find

its roots in colonialism,

a mercantilist system that was

designed to be extractive to the colonies. The colonies
existed simply to provide raw goods and materials to the
mother country.

Today,

the school of dependency argues

that the former colonies, modern-day developing nations,
find themselves remaining on the periphery,
colonial nations still in the center.2

and the former

When Nurse and

Sandiford argue that the Windward Islands are located on

the "periphery," they are referring to the islands'
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continued dependence upon a single,

cash crop export to the

center state to maintain their respective economies.3

considering the relationship between Europe,
the United Kingdom, and the Caribbean,
Windward Islands,

When

in particular

in particular the

it is best to view this relationship as

one of former mother to former colony,

of the center to the

periphery. In essence, there remains a relationship of
dependency.

Single-Crop Dependence
Bananas play a significant role in the Windward Island
economies.

(See Figure 1)

On the whole,

estimates are that

the industry accounts for on average about 18 percent of
the total Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) in the Windward

Islands.4 Bananas are also the largest employer on these
islands.

In 1990,

it was estimated that those involved in

banana production constituted 33 percent of the workforce
in Dominica,
Vincent.

and nearly 70 percent of the workforce in St.

In St.

Lucia, while 20,000 people are employed by

the industry, an additional 40,000 depend on the industry
for income.5
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Figure 1 -Windward Islands
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1998
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The original colonial economies of these islands, much
like
--

the rest

of the Caribbean,

were concentrated on sugar

the cultivation of sugar cane and its byproducts,

including molasses and rum.
nineteenth century the brutal
prohibition

of slavery,

But by the middle of the
sugar industry,

and later,
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after

the first

the United

the

Kingdom's consumption shift from cane to beet sugar served
to threaten the success of the Caribbean's cane sugar
industry.

Cutting cane is an onerous activity,

and one

that free laborers at the time did not often undertake.
The passage of the Sugar Equalization Act in 1845 also
began to eliminate the preferential sugar market in
Britain,

negatively affecting Caribbean sugar trade.

As the economic attractiveness of exporting sugar

waned,

the islands turned to other products,

and nutmeg in Grenada,
Vincent.

More recently,

such as cocoa

limes in Dominica and cotton in St.
of course,

the islands have shifted

their respective foci to the service industry and tourism.
While banana production actually began in the Windward
Islands

in the nineteenth century,

it was not until the

early twentieth century that bananas became an export crop.
Early attempts by United Fruit, beginning in the 1920s to
cultivate a serious industry failed, due in part to disease
and also a series of hurricanes in the 1930s.

In 1950,

production resumed under the British company Antilles
Products Ltd.,

acquired in 1952 by Geest Industries.

At

the time Geest had already established a business in fresh

fruit and flowers, and was contacted by the various Banana
Growers'

Associations to ship and market all of the
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islands'

bananas.

India Committee,
with commercial

Both the British government and the West
an association of business representatives

interests in the Caribbean,

actively

encouraged and supported the Windward Island bananas entry
into the UK market.

the Imperial Economic

In 1925,

Committee had released a report entitled Report on
Marketing and Preparing for Market Foodstuffs Produced in
Overseas Parts of the Empire.

The report suggested that the

Windward Island banana production would diversify the UK's
source of supply to market,

thereby breaking the monopoly

held by United Fruit since 1902.

The Preferential Market

As members of the British empire, the Windward Islands
industry,

as with other members of the Caribbean, gained

duty-free entry into the UK market.

Fruit from non-

Commonwealth areas like Latin America were subject to
tariff and quota restrictions;

in fact,

the early market

was such that Latin American imports were only granted
licenses to import when there was a shortfall in supply.

This arrangement began in the early 1930s, a period of
rising protectionism throughout Europe.

For the UK,

it was

viewed as an attempt to break the American and United Fruit
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monopoly. During the 1930s and 1940s,

Caribbean,

the Commonwealth

along with other parts of the British empire,

were experiencing increasing social discontent and unrest,
much of which was directed against the Crown. The UK's

promotion of the banana industry was also its attempt to
help alleviate the socio-economic conditions of the
region's populace,

as detailed in the 1945 Moyne Commission

Report.
In the years preceding the second World War and after,
the preferential agreements with the Caribbean continued in
various forms, beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1957,
then the Yaound6 Convention in 1963,

which was replaced by

the Lome conventions, which began in 1975.

When the first

Lome agreement was signed between the European Economic

Community and the ACP nations, of the Windward Islands
Grenada was the sole independent state.
islands,

Dominica,

St.

Lucia and St.

The other three

Vincent,

were

automatically associated with the European Community as
colonial entities.

Under Lom6,

were granted duty-free

access,

faced a 20 percent tariff,

all ACP banana producers
while Latin American fruit

as part the EC's common external

tariff.
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The Lom6 agreements eventually evolved into the New
Banana Regime,

with essentially the same preferential

arrangement that somewhat excluded Latin American bananas.
Yet while ACP bananas were given duty-free access,

Latin

American bananas, operating under a regime that
discriminated against them,

still comprised more than 60

percent of the market.

It was this final regime,

effect on July 1,

1993,

upon which the United States based

its WTO dispute.

At this time bananas from the Caribbean

amounted to

just

that took

10 percent of the European banana market.

The Caribbean and the United States: Domination
Since the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine and the
era of

"Manifest Destiny" the United States expressed both

in policy and practice beginning in the nineteenth century,
the United States has maintained a relationship of
dominance over the Caribbean, even while the region was
still colonized by Great Britain. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine
simultaneously proclaimed U.S.

political supremacy and

warned against European involvement in the Western
hemisphere.

The Roosevelt Corollary,

added in 1904,

set

further parameters with the distinction that countries must
make good use of their independence.
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What these documents

together reflected was Washington's agenda of manifest
destiny,

of a "divine right" to rule the region, and

eventually,

to make the world safe for democracy. Beginning

in Cuba in 1899,

the United States subsequently intervened

or invaded militarily in the hemisphere at least eight
times, most recently in Panama in 1989. Originally, the
United States justified its action under the Monroe
Doctrine,

intervening in nations in order to as Wilson put

it in a different context,

democracy."

"make the world safe for

During the Cold War,

the United States

justified its behavior by its claim of promoting democracy
and quashing any communist or socialist efforts in an

attempt to prevent another Cuba, such as in Guyana and
Grenada. Currently, however,

in the contemporary, post-Cold

War era, the United States had undergone a marked shift in
regards to ideology, as it lacks an enemy and therefore an
overarching strategic foreign policy regarding the
Caribbean.

This lack of grand,

strategic vision has been

especially true in the case of the Clinton administration,
as throughout his presidency the United States has pursued
its foreign policy without any strategic or arching

ideology, but in its absence has approached problems in a
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piece-meal manner largely influenced by narrow domestic
interests.

Makinc

the World Safe for Democracy

Initially,

though, the United States espoused its

infamous Monroe Doctrine, an ideology,

indeed,

a destiny,

to model Latin America and the Caribbean into mini-models
of the United States.

The notion was that American

companies and ideas were the best import for the other

nations in the hemisphere.
One such case was of Guatemala in 1954,

where Jacobo

Arbenz sought to take his country in a political and
economic direction counter to that of the United States,

and paid the price for his efforts. Arbenz had introduced a
program of land distribution, which involved
reappropriating land owned by United Fruit Co.

Arbenz

offered UFC $1,185,000 as compensation for land the company
had valued at $19,350,000.10
known as el pulpo,

At the time, United Fruit,

or the octopus,

had been operating in

Guatemala for over half a century. The company had built
and monopolized the country's railroads,

controlled two of

its ports and operated the telegraph system.
of the company,

At the urging

the CIA backed an effort eventually led to
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Arbenz's resignation,

at which time a more pro-United Fruit

and therefore pro-American president was installed.
American relations with the Caribbean were indelibly
shaped by Fidel Castro's 1959 communist revolution in Cuba.
After Castro's revolution,

the specter of

"another Cuba,"

another communist nation in America's backyard dominated

U.S.

foreign policy toward the hemisphere. The principles

of the Monroe Doctrine, over a century later, were still an
essential factor in U.S. policy. A State Department press

release dated from 1960 declared that the principals of the
Monroe Doctrine were "as valid today as they were in
1823...Specifically, the Organization of the United States

and the Rio Treaty provide the means for common action to
protect the hemisphere against the interventionist and

aggressive demands of international communism."1 1

This

policy found its expression in the English-speaking
Caribbean with U.S.

reaction to,

first, Cheddi Jagan in

Guyana and then in Maurice Bishop in Grenada.
Jagan's rise to power came while Guyana -

at the time

called British Guiana - was still a British dependency.
Jagan led the People's Progressive Party
Marxist group,

(PPP), a pro-

causing the United States to fear another

communist-inspired regime.

The CIA again entered the
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picture,

tapping into the local trade union movement to

cause civil disturbances.

The disturbances resulted in

such public disorder that British troops landed,

suspended

the constitution and took the PPP out of office.
Eventually,

the pressure placed on Britain by the United

States was such that Jagan was forced out in
overtly this was seen to be a British effort,

1963.2

While

the covert

operations were maintained by the United States,

demonstrating to what extent the United States was prepared
to go to prevent another Cuba in the hemisphere.
Almost two decades later,
New Jewel Movement
Gairy's government.

in Grenada,

Maurice Bishop's

(NJM) arose in opposition to Eric
The NJM was at the least socialist in

tone, and appealed to the largely impoverished masses of
the tiny Eastern Caribbean island, whose livelihood
depended on its spice trade.

In March 1979, Bishop toppled

the Gairy government in a coup d'etat,

a move that no doubt

alarmed the other West Indian islands, who were accustomed
to the British-inherited,
government.

It may,

peaceful transition of

however,

have been somewhat silently

applauded by some of the West Indian islands that disliked

Gairy,

offended in particular by his authoritarian,

sometimes brutal style of government.
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As Grenada's West

Indian neighbors pondered their reception of Bishop,

Cuba

moved eagerly toward solidifying relations with the island,
a move that angered and further alienated the United
States.

The Cuban ambassador in Grenada became

increasingly involved with Bishop, who had earlier sought
Castro's counsel and support.

This culminated in Bishop's

announcement in November of 1979 that 250 Cubans would soon
start helping Grenada build a new international airport.
At that point,

even further.

U.S.-Grenadian relations deteriorated

While the other West Indian states may not

have supported Bishop,
States'

they certainly resented the United

influence in the matter.

The fact that other West

Indian states opposed the U.S. viewpoint, no doubt thinking
that the United States was interfering, can be seen clearly
in several examples prior to the 1983 U.S.
April 1982,

invasion.

In

President Ronald Reagan, vacationing in

Barbados, invited other local heads of state for a miniconference, but notably excluded Grenada and St. Lucia,
which at the time was being governed by a radical wing of
the Labour Party.

The Caribbean response was

instantaneous, with criticism led by Grenada's most vocal
critic,

Barbadian Prime Minister Tom Adams.

Adams noted

that the islands did not wish to engage in "ideological
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battles" with the United States.13

Later,

in February 1983,

at the CARICOM Heads of Government meeting,

the leaders

voted to accept "ideological pluralism" as a principle of
their foreign policy.

The underlying assumption,

then,

was

for the nations to accept some variances in ideology
between themselves,

with the foremost goal of maintaining

regional solidarity.14
In 1983 the Bishop regime was brought to an abrupt
halt by a violent coup within the People's Revolutionary
Government party.

Bernard Coard,

Bishop's deputy prime

minister and minister of finance, had marshaled enough
support of his own within the party and the military.
October 13,

1983,

On

Coard placed Bishop and several others

loyal to him under house arrest, assuming leadership of the
country. Six days later, on October 19, thousands of
students marched on the house to free Bishop and
confrontation took place at Fort Rupert.

Between 50 to 400

people were killed by Coard's group and the army.'5

Bishop

and several of his cabinet was executed.
Soon U.S.

troops entered the country.

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
emergency meeting in Barbados,
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The

(OECS)

held an

a non-OECS country,

the

result of which was a request for the United States to
intervene in Grenada.

After the Cold War
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 not only signaled

the defeat of communism in most of the world, but also a
victory for capitalism.

In doing so,

it left the United

States without an apparent enemy for the first time since
the end of World War II.

Since

1989, what has shaped U.S.

foreign policy, especially toward the Caribbean?

Many

observers have argued that the United States has actually
had no overarching foreign policy strategy with regard to
the Caribbean and Latin America.16
States,

Instead,

the United

especially during the Clinton administration,

has

had a reactive rather than proactive strategy or policy in
regards to foreign affairs.

While it is arguable that this

reactive attitude has characterized the Clinton
administration generally,
foreign affairs,

both in domestic as well as

the fact remains that the United States

lacks an obvious enemy in the traditional sense.

Indeed,

Samuel Huntington has argued that America has undergone a
crisis of national identity given the lack of an enemy to
unite the country.

As such,

Huntington argues that without
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any cohesive interest,

U.S.

foreign policy,

even the actual identity of the nation,

and indeed,

is destined to be

fought over by various domestic ethnic groups struggling

for power.

17

While this is a somewhat overgeneralized argument,
Huntington's initial thesis is not without merit.

In fact,

his theory resonates with other scholars who have quite
rightly pointed out that American foreign policy,

especially toward the Caribbean which has always of
tertiary importance to the United States,

has suffered from

a lack of cohesive strategy since the fall of Communism.
As such,

beginning with President George Bush,

throughout Clinton's presidency, the U.S.

and

foreign policy

toward the Caribbean can only be characterized as being
largely motivated by either small, vocal and influential
domestic interest groups, what can be termed "policy

communities" or by a broadly-based fear of refugees,
illegal drugs or terrorism.1 8

Here again Putnam's theory of

two-level analysis, especially in regards to win-sets,
finds resonance: the more vocal or larger the amount of
support domestically builds a country's win-set,

and

greater chance of what that domestic win-set is advocating

for to succeed at the international level.
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Robert Pastor calls this kind of foreign policy the
"postwar rhythm and blues," arguing that in 1992,
United States

was

the

in the midst of a post-Gulf War shift

from extroversion to introversion,

and that Clinton was

first elected precisely because of his focus on domestic
policy.

9

Clinton also had to contend,

Pastor argues, with

issues remaining from the previous Bush administration,
most notably,
(NAFTA).

the North American Free Trade Agreement

Clinton's primary policy efforts in this

hemisphere during the first two years of his presidency
were related with NAFTA.

Two years later,

after the 1994

elections left Clinton with a Republican-led Congress,

hemisphere policy became even more politicized.

Foreign

policy was a vehicle, a tool for winning constituent
support, rather than a response to the world outside. Thus,
Pastor argues:
Instead of relating US interests to changes in the
world, as had been done in the past, the Clinton
administration approached the challenge of remaining
engaged globally from the opposite direction: managing
the internal causes and consequences of international
crises.20

In this environment arose the outcropping of constituent
groups,

or so-called policy communities,

interest groups,

small but vocal

usually ethnic minorities or what many

including Bryan refers to as

"hyphenated Americans" who
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help formulate American policy."2

One such case is

the Cuban-American community in South Florida,

that

of

which makes

up an important constituent group in the state of Florida,
While much

always a key state for presidential elections.
of the South Florida Cuban-American ideology,
of most Hispanic groups,

unlike that

is strikingly conservative and

therefore finds support in the Republican party,

the

Democrats have always attempted to court the group as well.
In the absence of the Cold War,

and with a general easing

of tensions toward once adversarial nations,

the United

States has in actuality become more rigid in its relations
with Cuba.

For example,

in 1997,

when CARICOM proposed

setting up a committee to examine whether to establish

relations with Cuba,
Congress was of fury.

the immediate reaction in the U.S.
Rep. Dan Burton,

a Republican from

Indiana, a strident, right-wing politician and a member of
the Committee on International Relations for more than
fifteen years, proposed a bill that would ban CARICOM trade
privileges should the organization admit Cuba into its

market.2

In this case the Cuban-American community adds to

the win-set within Congress,

such as Burton,

and helps to

perpetuate the anti-Castro stance the United States has
taken.
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Likewise,

it can be argued that the U.S. policy in

pursuing the banana dispute was defined by a similarly
narrow interest,

as detailed in the previous chapter,

the

constant and numerous financial contributions of Chiquita
CEO Karl Lindner.

Prior to Lindner's efforts the United

States had indicated no interest in pursuing this battle
over trade.

Once the investigation was initiated,

however,

the Caribbean nations attempted to lobby the United States
as well,

but to no avail.

Between December 1994 and May

1997, members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States

(OECS) met with representatives of the U.S.

government,

including USTR Kantor.

the Miami Summit of the Americas,

In December 1994,

at

a joint committee of the

OECS and the U.S. Trade Office convened on the banana
issue.

The month prior,

Lindner had reached a peak of his

lobbying campaign in spending a night in the Lincoln
Bedroom.

The United States, according to the Caribbean

leaders, took an uncompromising position, and told the OECS
leaders that there was no room to negotiate.
Clinton met with the OECS in Barbados.
the time St.

Lucia's Prime Minister,

In May 1997,

Vaughn Lewis,

at

presented a position

paper to Clinton outlining the importance of the banana
issue to the OECS economies.

Clinton,
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at the time,

misleadingly professed that he knew little about the issue,
and promised to look into it. Nothing of substance
materialized.

The United States

and Europe: A Relationship

in

Flux

The emerging post Cold War structure had

realmifications,
hemisphere.

of course, for U.S. relations beyond the

As communism began to fade throughout Europe,

so did the power of the Soviet Union.

The United States

emerged from the Cold War as the sole surviving superpower,
changing the very structure of world politics.

Huntington

argues that the global structure of politics has shifted
from a bi-polar system to system where the United States is
the lone superpower surrounded by several major powers.

Other scholars have supplemented this argument with the
theory that the single-most significant threat to U.S.
superpower status, both economically and politically,

comes

from its closest ally, Europe and the European Community.
Fred Bergsten calls the introduction of the euro the first
currency that could viably rival the American dollar,

and

as such the euro represents a seismic shift because of its
threat to America's supremacy.2 5 The two-way trade across
the Atlantic between the United States and Europe is
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indeed

a massive,

paramount alliance:

relations between the two

have been recently valued at between $300 and $400 billion
in trade flows,
way investment.

and an additional $600-700 billion in two26

Yet in this particular relationship,

both

Europe and the United States, while remaining close allies,
are in a period of flux:

both are attempting to define and

demarcate the status of their respective relationships,

and

the banana dispute served as the first major example of
this.

Post-Cold War
The end of the cold war left the United States with an
inflated self-image that Samuel Huntington characterizes as

"benign hegemony." 2 7 Ironically,

this view of the United

States as the singularly necessary world power is mistaken,
for it lacks an acknowledgement of the other major powers
within the system,

such as the European states or China.

Perhaps the best expression of America's pretensions of
superiority comes from Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, who has called the United States the
"indispensable" nation and has said that as the United
States,

"We stand tall and hence see further than other

nations." 28

While it is obvious that the United States

65

certainly plays a role in most major global problems and

situations, it is certainly plausible and arguable that
other nations are equally as important to the international
community.
This American attitude of superiority finds its
expression as U.S.

government officials insist that the

United States is merely working with the rest of the
international community in order to advance "universal"
values,

as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence

Summers said,

while in reality,

the United States is often

pushing unilateral action that advances American interests.
Huntington recalls the astute observation by a British
diplomat that one only reads about the world's desire for

American leadership within the United States, whereas
elsewhere one reads about American arrogance and
unilateralism.

While this attitude has found its most

obvious display in American military operations, either in
the Gulf War or Panama,

for example,

American foreign economic policy.

it appears as well in

For example, Huntington

refers to America's "bludgeoning" of other countries to get
them to adopt economic and social policies that benefit
American economic interests.
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Huntington sees the single most important threat to

the current unipolar, major power system as not only the
formation of the European Union,
euro,

a common European currency.

but the creation of the
Bergsten concurs,

likewise calling the introduction of the euro potentially a
seismic shift in the world power structure.

The euro,

in

his telling, represents the possibility of facilitating a
return to the bipolar international system,

at the very

least in economic terms. 30 Bergsten argues that economic
relations between Europe and the United States must rest on
a foundation of equality,

although the two have yet to

develop how exactly this will occur.

Instead, as the two

strive to begin to define this new relationship,
focused on narrow,
banana case.

they have

technical issues, beginning with the

In Bergsten's words:

Officials devote enormous attention to minutiae but
none to common strategy or the requisite institutional
mechanisms for tackling a growing number of acute
challenges. They react on an ad hoc basis to virtually
every problem that arises while failing to anticipate
readily foreseeable obstacles.
Both Europe and the United States have failed to

develop an overarching strategy in regards to economic
relations between the two,

perhaps because simply reacting

to issues, especially minor ones,
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entails little risk.

Conclusion
Certainly the banana case is one that presented little
risk to the United States.
victory,

It was a virtually assured

as the WTO had already ruled several times that

the regime was discriminatory.
Cold War era,

Furthermore,

in the post

the United States has viewed the Caribbean as

increasingly irrelevant, and has undertaken policy changes
in the region only after being encouraged to do so by
particular policy communities,

community in Miami.

such as the Cuban-American

In this case U.S.

foreign policy was

influenced by the narrow corporate interest group of
Chiquita Bananas,

set its own best interests foremost.

Coupled with the rising influence of the European Union,
the United States used this case as an opportunity to
assert itself,

situation,

in a minimal-risk,

almost assured victory

in regards to the European Union.

Nurse and Sandiford, 1995.
Cardoso, Enrique. Depedency and Development in Latin America.
Berkeley: University of California, 1979.
3 The one exception is the island of Grenada, which is a significant
exporter of the spice nutmeg, and also cultivates a tourist industry,
somewhat diversifying its economy.
4 Nurse and Sandiford, 1995.
s Ibid.
2

6

Ibid.

7 Ibid.
* Ibid.
9 It has been previously noted in the first chapter that Germany
initially refused to sign the Treaty of Rome in part because of the
preferential banana regime it established.
In 1957, Germany had an
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annex of a special banana protocol which still applied; Germany did not
sign the Banana Protocol of Lome, and the tariff applied to all member
states but Germany for this very same reason.
10 Dosal,
Paul. Doing Business with Dictators:
A Political
History
of
United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899-1944. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources,
1993.
1 Maingot,
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Chapter Four
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

To return again to the original operating questions
posed by Frederick Mayer:

what is the game,

players and how do they play?
detail U.S.
essentially,

who are the

This study has attempted to

involvement in the decade-long banana dispute,
not just how and why the United States

involved itself in this European-Caribbean affair, but also
exactly who were the individuals and groups that helped to
create this event.

The United States used this banana

trade dispute as a opportunity to serve dual domestic and
international purposes,
interests as well:

which in the end furthered its own

first,

pursuing the case rewarded a

long-time political and financial supporter,

Chiquita CEO

Carl Lindner, helping to affirm and perpetuate the allimportant American lobbying system. Finally,

and more

importantly, the dispute served as an opportunity for the
United States to demonstrate power over Europe,

albeit,

and

perhaps even because, it was a third-party dispute, where
the United States and Europe did not directly clash.

The

dispute served foremost as a symbolic victory for the
United States as its first attempt to define an economic
relationship against the growing presence of the European
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Union.

While the third player,

the Caribbean,

in the crossfire of this dispute,

was caught

it is important to

remember that the region still played an essential role,
without which there would not have been a dispute.

Methodology and framework
This study utilizes

the

Milner and then Putnam.1
results from interests,

framework

set

out by first

Milner argues that foreign policy
institutions and information, a

polyarchic system of groups that share power,
necessarily equitably,
The

although not

during the decision making process.

U.S. system fits perfectly into Milner's notion of

polyarchy;

the very structure of American government is a

tripartite system of executive,

legislative and

judicial

governing bodies, as influenced by the electorate and
interest groups.

For the purposes of this study,

Robert

Putnam takes Milner's analysis further with his depiction
of policy making, particularly foreign policy, as occurring
at two levels, or perhaps more succinctly,

in two spheres.

Putnam sees the game as one in which the major leader is
surrounded by two simultaneous spheres of

influence,

domestic,

or external,

with its

or internal,

one international,

one
each

own set of actors and groups that apply pressure
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and influence to the decision making process.

Putnam's

"win-set" theory argues that the greater the amount of
domestic support

for an issue,

the larger the win-set and

greater chance of success at the international level.
Within this study,

domestically,

the politics of banana

dispute involved key members of Congress,

the White House,

the USTR and the special corporate interests of Chiquita
Bananas Inc.

who helped to build a powerful win-set.

Internationally,
the Caribbean,

it involved relations between Europe and

the Caribbean and the United States,

and the

United States and Europe.

Chi qui ta' s Lobbying Influence

The Chiquita Brands International of today is in
actuality a modern incarnation of the infamous United Fruit

Company of old, the very same company that gave rise to the
term "banana republic" for its tenacious hold over some
Latin American countries.

While it was initially broken up

by the U.S. Department of Justice for antitrust violations,
which,

ironically,

occurred at the same time as another arm

of American federal government,

the CIA, was encouraging

insurgency in Guatemala against Arbenz's land
appropriations schemes, the company has retained a dominant
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position in the world banana market for over a century,
although in the past few decades that has been shared with
Dole Brands and Del Monte, also American companies.
Together,

these big three have around 75 percent of the

world market in bananas,

and similarly retain a majority

share in the European Market,
its "dollar" bananas,
Island bananas.

which discriminates against

which are cheaper than Windward

This is because the Latin American banana

is produced on large plantations,

and as such enjoys large

economies of scale, and overall a more efficient means of
production,

as compared with the Caribbean product.

Moreover, Latin American bananas are better in quality and
maintain consistent size and color,

an important part of

the contemporary consumer market. Dole and Del Monte have
managed to actually increase their share of the European

market despite the preferential regime. Chiquita, however,
claiming that its company suffered significant financial
loss because of the European preference system,

took its

complaint to the USTR.
The American political and electoral system of
campaigning is such that it has become routine for interest

groups, whether they are ideological or corporate,
campaigning politicians.

As such,
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to be

relations are developed

then that continue after politicians get elected,

as

evidenced in part by the case of Lindner and his lobbying
efforts for Chiquita in Washington.
lobbying,

Prior to Lindner's

it does not appear that the United States

seriously considered taking on the banana regime through a
WTO dispute.

In fact, prior to his extensive campaign that

began in 1994,

Lindner made an initial attempt in the early

1990s to ask the government to initiate an investigation,
but was rebuffed. During the course of his extensive

lobbying campaign,

it has been estimated that Lindner

contributed around $7.1 million: $4.2 million to
Republicans,

$1.4 to Democrats and an additional $1.5

million to Washington lobbyists.

It was only after Lindner hired Washington lobbyists,
marshaled the support of key Senators, such as Bob Dole and
Trent Lott,

and began actively contributing to the White

House that the USTR Mickey Kantor announced the initial
investigation in 1994,
1996.

and then the formal WTO case in

It was Lindner's lobbying,

as he was granted access

to key officials because of his extensive financial and
other political support, that brought the case to forefront
of the United States'

attention.

In first initiating the

investigation and finally bringing the case, the Clinton
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administration was able to reward an extremely influential

lobbyist.

During this dispute,

attempted to lobby the U.S.

other businesses also

government over the issue,

especially concerning the list of sanctioned items that
were subject

to a 100 percent punitive

tariff

2

.

Large

companies such as Gillette were able to successfully lobby
the government to have items related to its industry taken

off the prohibited list; other small businesses who did not
lobby the government had items affecting their businesses

remain on the list. By rewarding Chiquita and Gillete, two
companies who worked within the political system of
lobbying,

the Clinton administration and members of

Congress were affirming the lobbying system.

In marshalling

Washington to its cause, Lindner built up a powerful winset against Europe and the Caribbean's case.

Dependency, Domination and Flux
It is ironic that the original banana trade agreements

between the United Kingdom and the Eastern Caribbean island
as an attempt to break the

nations were developed partially

monopolistic hold the United Fruit Company had on the UK's
banana market toward the beginning of the century.

Bananas

had replaced sugar as the "green gold" crop of export of
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the Caribbean toward the beginning of the 1900s,

and as an

attempt to both break United Fruit's monopoly and encourage
an industry in the colonial Eastern Caribbean islands,
preferential trade agreements for the banana industry were
created.

Indeed,

the relationship was not simply between

the United Kingdom and the Eastern Caribbean,

but largely,

as first expressed in the Treaty of Rome in 1958,
in the Lome Conventions,

and later

between Europe and 71 African,

Caribbean and Pacific colonies. When the Lome Conventions
were formally enacted in 1975,
countries of Dominica,

of the Windward Island

Grenada,

St.

Lucia and St. Vincent,

only Grenada was independent; the rest were still under the
British Crown.

While the initial relationship between the

two was one of empire to colony, the relationship remains
one of dependency, with these Caribbean nations relying on
a single crop export, bananas, to maintain virtually their
entire economy.
On average, bananas account for about 18 percent of
the total GDP in the Windward Islands.

In 1998,

bananas

compromised an average of approximately 27 percent of total
exports,

with the lowest being 12.5 percent in Grenada and

the highest 42 percent in St.

Vincent.

Similarly,

the

banana industry is also the largest employer in these
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islands,

accounting for nearly 30 percent of jobs in

Dominica,

and 70 percent in St.

Vincent. Banana production

in the Eastern Caribbean occurs largely by small growers or
individual

farmers on small plantations,

in contrast to the

large-scale plantations in Latin America,

where workers are

paid less.
While the Lome convention is a formal expression of
the preferential relationship between Europe and its former
colonies,

it has become threatened by both the European

Community and its Single European Market,

as well as the

continued globalization of the world economy. The Single
European Market,

of course,

requires that all participating

nations integrate their trade schemes.

In the case of

bananas, e.g., the United Kingdom and France had maintained
preferential schemes while Germany did not.
preferential banana scheme,

Indeed, the

which discriminated against

Latin American imports, had already been found in violation
of both GATT and then WTO trade rules, prior to this most
recent, and equally unfavorable,

ruling.

If this case is any indication of the future of
then it points to the waning

European-Caribbean relations,

common heritage, and subsequent relationship, the two have
maintained for over 500 years.
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As is the trend with all

former colonies as formally expressed in the Uruguay Round
of trade negotiations,

Caribbean nations can no longer

guarantee that their former colonial connection to Europe
will ensure protection and assistance,

particularly in

regards to trade preferences. Dependence on a single crop
makes for an especially vulnerable economy.

Product

diversification, however difficult to achieve, is clearly
needed,

something that Nurse and Sandiford forewarned years

before this final, and apparently most serious dissolution
of the trading scheme.3

This warning has been especially

true in terms of trade and development assistance,
something Sutton refers to as one diluted by both time and

the pace of global change.4
And as this case indicates,

it is increasingly true that

within this modern global economy,

smaller economies such

as the Eastern Caribbean stand to be pushed aside in terms
of larger nations'

goals and interests.

In terms of relations between the Caribbean and the
United States, the domination of the United States has been
a constant presence since the Caribbean was still under the
colonial empire of Europe.
Doctrine,

Beginning with the Monroe

and later with the Roosevelt Corollary,
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the

United States set out to make the hemisphere safe for
democracy,

and the Caribbean was no exception.

Since the beginning of the Cold War, particularly with
the Cuban Revolution of 1959,

the United States focused on

containing the communist element in the hemisphere to Cuba,
and as such combated leftist and quasi-communist
governments in first British Guiana

(while it was still a

UK dependent)

The CIA worked to

and then in Grenada.

undermine Guiana's Cheddi Jagan by tapping into the local
trade groups to cause public unrest,

and working covertly

to encourage the British to force Jagan out of office.
the 1980s,

under Ronald Reagan, U.S.

In

troops entered the

tiny Eastern Caribbean island of Grenada after a bloody

coup within the ruling socialist party, Maurice Bishop's
New Jewel Movement.

Until Bernard Coard led the internal

coup, which resulted in numerous deaths, including Bishop's
execution,

the other Caribbean nations had at least

cautiously indicated some support of the regime, much to
Washington's consternation.

Largely, though, because the

English-speaking Caribbean has generally enjoyed stable,
democratic governments since independence,

the United

States has been less concerned with the region.
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The demise of the Cold War,

has made the region less

significant to the United States.

This is even more so

true in the English-speaking Caribbean,
tradition of stable democracies.

which has enjoyed a

Ken Boodhoo uses the term

policy community to describe the narrow interest groups who
have attempted to fill the ideological vacuum left by the
end of the Cold War.m

Anthony Bryan and Robert Pastor have

characterized American strategy toward the Caribbean in the
1990s as a type of reactive rather than proactive policy.
The United States in this piece-meal approach has deemed
the plight of the Eastern Caribbean economic situation

relatively unimportant,

the only possible help the current

renegotiations the trade assistance to the Caribbean,

now

being considered in Congress. Unlike the Cuban situation,
there is no vocal, politically significant group of

"hyphenated Americans" who attempt to influence AmericanCaribbean policy.
Until or unless these islands pose a serious security

or domestic political problem, such as drug trafficking or
a flood of migrant populations, the United States will
likely continue to summarily disregard the region, as it
did when the QECS attempted to persuade the United States
to reconsider on the banana issue.
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While a massive flood

of immigrants from these islands is an unlikely scenario,
the threat of illegal drug cultivation and trafficking is a
very real one for these islands.

If past policy of the

United States has been any indication,

it will not be until

a serious problem arises that the United States will devote
any attention to the issue.

The underlying, and most important influence
throughout this entire case,

however,

lies in understanding

the relationship between the Europe and the United States,

for changes within this relationship are really what
motivated the United States to pursue this case.

The

combination of the end of the Cold War and the advent of
the European Union,

along with its euro dollar, has

signaled a possible a seismic shift in European-American
relations,

largely because the European Union presents the

first serious threat to American economic and political
hegemony.

Samuel Huntington calls America's position in

the world system an inflated self-image of "benign
hegemony,"

one in which the United States assumes it is the

only essential superpower remaining in the world system.6
While it is certainly true to say that the United States

may be the only superpower, Huntington is correct to point
out that the United States is surrounded by many major
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The rising power economically as well as

powers.

politically,

is Europe.

Fred Bergsten sees the global

economic identities of both Europe and the United States as
virtually similar:

the EU accounts for about 31 percent of

world output and 20 percent of world trade; the United
States,

similarly,

accounts for 27 percent of output and 18

percent of world trade.7

The introduction of the euro has

particularly served as an indicator of this seismic shift
economically,

in terms of the euro being the first currency

to pose a serious threat to the dollar.
What has made this emerging power struggle difficult
to characterize and perhaps even to observe,
the fact that America and Western Europe

however,

is

(the core of

present-day EU members) have since 1950 enjoyed a strong

alliance.

As the two begin to define and work out the

terms of their new relationship, particularly economically,
both sides are understandably reluctant to make bold moves,
given the added risks of the relationship.

Bergsten has

argued that a gulf exists between Europe and the United

States, both of whom have more recently focused on small,
technical issues in an attempt to negotiate the changing
terms of their relationship.

This contention is evidenced
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by the ongoing disputes

in hormone-treated beef,

the steel

industry or disagreements regarding pharmaceutical testing.
The banana case symbolizes a shift in EuropeanAmerican relations.

The United States,

to assert its power,

recognizing the need

chose a minimal risk,

case in order to display a show of power.
Europe,

of course,

minimal loss
The concern in

is that the United States continues to

display a sort of superior superpower attitude,

as

evidenced by USTR Barskefksy's statement that the United
States is attempting to combat "unilateral" EU action
against Latin American imports.

It would behoove the

United States to recognize Europe's increasing influence,
and begin to work with the EU in an earnest, more equitable

type of arrangement. The concern for the EU is in a broader
context regarding the WTO and enforcement.

The banana

regime has been repeatedly ruled in violation, and it is
important for Europe to set an example of compliance with
the WTO rulings, as they have not in past banana rulings
truly

done so.

It is likely that the relationship between the two
will be worked out incrementally,
rather than in major issues.

through small cases

It is significant that this

dispute was not a direct confrontation,
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but done through a

the Caribbean islands and their preferential

third party:

trading scheme.

What the banana case is perhaps most

indicative of is this newly emerging economic relationship
between the United States and Europe.
War has seen,

indeed facilitated,

The end of the Cold

the rise of Europe's

In an attempt to define itself and how it relates to

power.
others,

particularly Europe,

the banana case was a

relatively painless cause for the United States to take up.
The Clinton administration regarded the Eastern Caribbean
as relatively unimportant,
globalized,

even more so in the era of a

post-Cold War economy. The case was

persistently brought to the administration's attention by
an influential and powerful lobby in Carl Lindner, who
managed to garner strong and bipartisan support for his
cause, which had virtually little opposition among either
the American public or influential policy communities. To
use Putnam's language,

in this particular case the

international actors of Europe and the Caribbean faced a
powerful win-set domestically.

Lindner had marshaled

senior, bi-partisan support in Congress and the White
House.
In pursuing the case, the United States realized that

it could satisfy this particular domestic interest and an
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important
victory

1

international interest, a positive, if

minor

over an ascending Europe.

Milner 1997,

Putnam 1988.

The United States initially had a list of 42 European imports that
were to be subject to a 100 percent tariff. The United States had
claimed this would be compensation for the money lost by American
companies who were subject to European tariffs in with their Latin
American bananas in the preferential system.
3 Nurse and Sandiford 1995.
4 Sutton, Paul. "Toward a New Partnership? The Future of CaribbeanEuropean Union relations." Hemisphere, Spring 2000, Vol. 9, No. 2, 102

11.

5 Boodhoo, 2000.
6

7

s

Huntington, 1999.
ergsten, 1999.
Ibid.
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